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Rights of the Terminally Ill Patient*
John Hodgson**
INTRODUCTION
This topic can be treated broadly or narrowly. The broad
view takes terminally ill patients as merely a subset of patients,
with all the rights and expectations involved. The narrow view
concentrates on those rights and expectations peculiar to the
terminal phase. I propose, for reasons of time, to veer to the
narrow view, thus excluding, for instance, any discussion of ab-
solute or relative entitlement to care, in other words, the whole
debate on rationing. I do propose, however, to treat all perma-
nently incompetent patients as within the scope of these re-
marks, notwithstanding that a vegetative, rather than a cerebral,
existence may be capable of being sustained for a prolonged pe-
riod. This probably reflects my personal persuasion that if there
is "no one at home," the essence of human life is absent.
Within these parameters, there are four distinct issues: (1) dis-
tinguishing between competent and incompetent patients; (2)
giving effect to the wishes of the competent patient; (3) making
decisions about the incompetent; and (4) defining the bounda-
ries of euthanasia.
I. COMPETENCE
By no means do all terminally ill patients lack competence. It
is important to distinguish four categories: (1) the competent;
(2) those, such as children and those with learning difficulties,
who have never been competent; (3) those who have become
incompetent, but previously expressed an intention in relation
to their treatment by means of an advance directive or other-
wise; and (4) those who have become incompetent prior to ex-
pressing any intention.
* This paper was presented at the Sixth Annual Comparative Health Law
Conference, "The Rights of Patients," sponsored by Loyola University Chicago School
of Law, Institute for Health Law in July of 1995.
** John Hodgson received his Master of Laws magna cum laude from Cambridge
University. He served as a solicitor and is now a Principal Lecturer at The Notting-
ham Law School, The Nottingham-Trent University in Nottingham, England.
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It is submitted that, in principle, the first and third group can
be equiparated, as can the second and fourth group. There are
two specific problems, namely the extent of the competence of
children, and the extent to which either doctors or judges are
bound by a prior declaration of intention.
1I. THE EFFECT OF CONSENT
One of the ruling axioms of medical ethics is the autonomy
principle. In the case of a competent patient, self-determination
is paramount and that patient may validly refuse consent to
treatment.1 This may extend to requiring the discontinuance of
life support.2 Senior judges have repeatedly emphasized this.
Lord Scarman, in Sidaway v. Board of Governors of the Bethlem
Royal Hospital and Maudsley Hospital, stated that this right to
accept or refuse treatment "may be seen as a basic human right
protected by the common law."'3 Lord Templeman in the same
case stated that the refusal may be for reasons that are rational
or irrational or for no reason. The absolute and unconditional
nature of the right of the competent patient was reiterated by
Lord Mustill in Airedale NHS Trust v. Bland.4 There is one first-
instance decision that rejects this view, Re S.5 In this case, Sir
Stephen Brown, P. (President of the Family Divison of the High
Court), compelled a woman to undergo a caesarean section,
which proved unsuccessful. The woman and her husband both
objected on religious and/or moral grounds. The judge used a
discredited line of United States authority that gave great
weight to the supposed interests of the foetus, and the decision
has been trenchantly criticized on principle and also on ethnic
grounds (the woman in Re S was black). It has been suggested,
however, that the judge was also motivated by a desire, in the
face of advice that the woman's own life was in danger, not to
leave her existing young children motherless. There is some ten-
tative support for this approach from comments of Lord Don-
aldson, Master of the Rolls, in Re T (Adult: Refusal of
Treatment).6 Although the right of self-determination was nor-
mally absolute, allowing it where it would lead to the death of a
1. R. v. Blaue, [1975] 3 All E.R. 446 (C.A.).
2. Nancy B. v. Hotel-Dieu de Quebec, 86 D.L.R.4th 385 (Que. Super. Ct. 1992).
3. [1985] 1 App. Cas. 871 (H.L.) (LEXIS, UK library, ALLCAS file at *8).
4. [1993] 1 All E.R. 821 (H.L.) (LEXIS, UK library, ALLCASE file).
5. Re S (Adult: Refusal of Treatment), [1992] 4 All E.R. 671 (Far.).
6. [1992] 4 All E.R. 649 (C.A.). Sir Stephen Brown, P. notes in Re S that this
central point was left open in Re T.
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viable foetus would be a novel problem of considerable legal
and ethical complexity, our first issue.7
It therefore seems to follow in all other cases that if an adult
patient has clearly stated a desire not to be subjected to certain
forms of resuscitation, or indeed to any other form of treatment,
the doctor must respect those wishes.8 In Blaue, a criminal case,
the victim of an assault was a Jehovah's Witness and refused
consent to a blood transfusion. There was no suggestion of criti-
cism of the doctor, who respected her wishes. Indeed, it might
well have been a wrongful invasion of her interests to treat her.9
These cases presuppose that there is a currently competent
patient. This can be problematic. Is the patient actually compos
mentis and/or sui juris? There is a strong temptation to say that
a wish to die expressed by one who, objectively, has the prospect
of a reasonable quantum of life of good quality is itself so irra-
tional as to be prima facie evidence of such mental dise-
quilibrium as to amount to incapacity. Doctors have learned to
hold back where this view is expressed on defined religious
grounds, but the temptation to intervene can be irresistible
otherwise. Similar problems also occur in relation to patients
who arguably become incompetent after giving a formal or in-
formal advance directive. 10
The law rebuttably presumes that all adults have the requisite
capacity." The crucial question is what test is to be used to as-
sess whether the presumption is rebutted. The current test in
the Mental Health Act of 1983 is whether the patient under-
stands the "nature, purpose and likely effects" of the treat-
ment.12 In Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation),3 Lord Brandon
referred to understanding the nature or purpose of the treat-
ment proposed. There is a distinction between long-term
mental disablement and short-term factors such as shock and
stress. In the latter case, it is a question, as it was in Re T,1 4 of
7. See LAW COMMISSION CONSULTATION PAPER No. 129, MENTALLY INCAPACI-
TATED ADULTS AND DECISION MAKING: MEDICAL TREATMENT AND RESEARCH § 2.1
(HMSO 1993) [hereinafter LAW COMM'N].
8. Blaue, [1975] 3 All E.R. 446.
9. Malette v. Shulman, 67 D.L.R.4th 321 (Ont. Ct. App. 1990). There is plenty of
anecdotal evidence of patients being treated despite objections who subsequently ex-
press gratitude to the doctors who overrode their apparent exercise of autonomy.
10. Re T (Adult: Refusal of Treatment), [1992] 4 All E.R. 649 (C.A.).
11. Id.
12. Mental Health Act, 1983, c.20, §§ 57(2)(a), 58(3)(b) (Eng.).
13. [1990] 2 App. Cas. 1 (H.L.).
14. [1992] 4 All E.R. 649 (C.A.).
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determining whether these factors vitiate an apparent refusal of
treatment. 15 The Mental Health Act Code of Practice stresses
capacity to understand the risks of treatment, although this is in
the context of avoiding claims for unauthorised interventions. 16
In Re C (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment),'7 Mr. Justice
Thorpe suggested that to be competent, the patient must com-
prehend the information supplied, believe it, and balance needs
and risks. The Law Commission has proposed a revised wording
for a "cognitive, or function, test" for the mentally disordered:
A mentally disordered person should be considered unable to
make the medical treatment decision in question if he or she is
unable to understand an explanation in broad terms and sim-
ple language of the basic information relevant to taking it, in-
cluding information about the reasonably foreseeable
consequences of taking or failing to take it, or is unable to re-
tain the information for long enough to make an effective
decision. 18
This avoids the subjective element in Re C, where the decision
may depend on the nature of the explanation actually given. 9 It
has been suggested that even where there is cognitive under-
standing, an "irrational" decision should still be overridden. 20
This is, however, dangerous. There is far too much scope for the
conscious or subconscious interposition of the social, cultural,
and moral values of the tribunal.2'
The second issue deals with children: the general age of ma-
jority is eighteen, but this does not apply to consent issues. First,
there is a modification of the general law that allows a child to
give consent at sixteen.22 Second, the court in Gillick v. West
Norfolk & Wisbech Area Health Authority23 held that it is under-
standing rather than age that is the key. In Gillick, a mother
asked for a ruling that a doctor could not give her daughter con-
traceptive advice or treatment until she reached the age of sex-
15. See LAW COMM'N, supra note 7, at §§ 2.5-2.6.
16. Id. at § 2.9.
17. [1994] 1 All E.R. 819 (Fam.).
18. LAW COMM'N, supra note 7, at § 2.12.
19. See Jean McHale, Consent and the Adult Patient: The Legal Perspective, in
NURSING LAW AND ETHICS 100 (John Tingle & Alan Cribbs eds., 1995).
20. See Margaret Brazier, Competence, Consent and Proxy Consent, in PROTECT-
ING THE VULNERABLE 34 (Margaret Brazier & Mary Lobjoit eds., 1991); Ian Ken-
nedy, Consent to Treatment, in DOCTORS, PATIENTS AND THE LAW (Clare Dyer ed.,
1992).
21. See McHale, supra note 19, at 100; LAW COMM'N, supra note 7, at § 2.
22. Family Law Reform Act, 1969, c.46, § 8(1) (Eng.).
23. [1986] 1 App. Cas. 112 (H.L.) (LEXIS, UK library, ALLCAS file).
[Vol. 5
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ual consent (sixteen). The court declined to make this ruling,
saying instead that it depended on whether the individual con-
cerned had sufficient understanding to consent to the particular
treatment:
[P]rovided the patient, whether a boy or a girl, is capable of
understanding what is proposed, and of expressing his or her
own wishes, I see no good reason for holding that he or she
lacks the capacity to express [his or her wishes] validly and
effectively and to authorise the medical man to ... give the
treatment ... 24
It must, however, be stressed that much of the case law fol-
lowing Gillick concerns the issue of children wishing to consent
to treatment that their parents wish to withhold. The courts are
not anxious to allow Gillick competence to justify a child's re-
fusal of lifesaving treatment. In Re S (A Minor) (Consent to
Medical Treatment),25 a fifteen-year-old girl was found not com-
petent under Gillick to refuse treatment for thalassemia (a
blood disease), including blood transfusions. She was influ-
enced by the beliefs of her Jehovah's Witness mother, and it was
said that she did not have capacity commensurate with the grav-
ity of the decision.
In the case of a child, it is in the first instance the parents who
must make any decision and give any necessary consent. If they
will not do so, the correct procedure is to make the child a ward
of the court and ask the court to make the decision.26 The
equivalent procedure in the case of an adult who is not compe-
tent is to apply to the court for a declaration; the Official Solici-
tor is then asked to represent the interests of the patient.27
There is no legal power to take responsibility in this sphere for
an incompetent adult.
24. Id. at *9 (Lord Fraser).
25. [1994] 2 F.L.R. 1065 (Fam.). See also Re W (A Minor) (Medical Treatment:
Court's Jurisdiction), [1993] 1 F.L.R. 1 (C.A.). A child competent under Gillick can
override parental objection, but not the objection of the court, whose power tran-
scends both.
26. Re B (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment), [1990] 3 All E.R. 927 (C.A.).
The court also has jurisdiction to make a specific issues order under section 8 of the
Children Act, 1989 (Eng.). Re R (A Minor) (Blood Transfusion), [1993] 2 F.L.R. 757
(Faro.).
27. Bland, [1993] 1 All E.R. 821 (H.L.). Lord Mustill, in particular, expressed
doubts as to the propriety and convenience of this procedure for reasons of a legally
complex and technical nature.
1996]
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III. GIVING EFFECT TO CONSENT
In principle, giving a consent its due effect is simply a matter
of ascertaining the wishes of a competent patient and respecting
them. This is easy to state in legal terms. Of course in practice,
a decision by a terminally ill patient to reject or discontinue
treatment requires very considerable input from medical and
nursing personnel. There is an obligation on the Secretary of
State28 to provide an efficient health service. The provision of
appropriate levels of advice, counseling, and care to the termi-
nally ill is clearly a part of such a service. It may not always be
possible to provide this, but there is no individual legal right to
any specific provision.29 Of more legal concern is when the pa-
tient's wishes are not regarded as binding.
This may arise in an acute case, of which Re T30 is a graphic
example. It is, however, much more likely to arise where there
is a relatively long-standing advance directive. Re T was,
strictly, an advance directive case, since by the time the action
was launched, T was unconscious-but it is far from typical.
Advance directives are still relatively little understood here,
but American experience with them, both generally and in the
context of resuscitation, has highlighted several dilemmas.
These largely centre around the issue of what is in the patient's
"best interest." Traditionally,
treatments are offered only when there is some degree by
which the expected benefits exceed the expected risks. In
short, physicians routinely make judgments based on risk-ben-
efit calculations, judgments that could plausibly be viewed as
not purely medical and that therefore could be made by pa-
tients based on their personal benefit and risk preferences.31
This process applies also to the decision to withhold or discon-
tinue treatment. Orentlicher concludes from an analysis of the
extent to which physicians respected advance directives that
they did so only when they coincided with the physician's own
value judgments about the patient and the prognosis.32 In other
words, while no doubt paying lip service to patient autonomy,
these doctors cannot resist the temptation to substitute their
28. National Health Service Act, 1977, c.49, § 3 (Eng.).
29. See Diana Brahams, The Critically Ill Patient: The Legal Perspective, in NURS-
ING LAW AND ETHics § 9.1, at 199 (John Tingle & Alan Cribb eds., 1995).
30. Re T (Adult: Refusal of Treatment), [1992] 4 All E.R. 649 (C.A.).
31. David Orentlicher, The Illusion of Patient Choice in End-of-Life Decisions,
267 JAMA 2101, 2101 (1992).
32. Id.
[Vol. 5174
6
Annals of Health Law, Vol. 5 [1996], Iss. 1, Art. 9
http://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol5/iss1/9
Rights of the Terminally Ill Patient
own judgment for that of the patient. The substantial anecdotal
evidence suggests that in the majority of cases, this leads to ag-
gressive intervention, although the converse may also occur.33
Cohen and Cohen point out the separate problem of context.34
The prognosis for those who arrest on general wards is very
poor because this is usually the culmination of the patient's fatal
illness, and a do-not-resuscitate (DNR) order, whether pursuant
to an advance directive or not, is justifiable by reference to the
ruling opportunity/benefit or best interests criteria. The progno-
sis for a perioperative arrest is much better. This is often
brought on by events in theatre (surgery) and can be relatively
readily reversed. Nontreatment is therefore not justified in this
context. It could be argued that any advance directive could be
construed as not applying to such circumstances.
The most authoritative consideration of these issues in the
United Kingdom was undertaken by the House of Lords Select
Committee on Medical Ethics.35 It strongly endorsed the princi-
ple of self-determination. It also endorsed the principle that any
advance directive should be respected. In ethical terms, this ap-
proach can be defended on the basis that it is the only approach
that fully respects the value of the patient as a human being and
as an autonomous agent (which is much the same thing).36 It is,
however, in Canada that the principle has been most clearly and
unequivocally stated, by the Ontario Court of Appeal in Flem-
ing v. Reid, as a traditional common law principle:
A patient, in anticipation of circumstances wherein he or she
may be unconscious or otherwise incapacitated and thus un-
able to contemporaneously express his or her wishes about a
particular form of medical treatment, may specify in advance
his or her refusal to consent to the proposed treatment. A
doctor is not free to disregard such advance instructions, even
in an emergency. The patient's right to forego treatment, in
the absence of some overriding societal interest, is paramount
to the doctor's obligation to provide medical care. This right
must be honoured, even though the treatment may be benefi-
cial or necessary to preserve the patient's life or health, and
33. Robert Campbell, The Critically Ill Patient. Ethical Perspective-Declining
and Withdrawing Treatment, in NURSING LAW AND ETHICS 218 (John Tingle & Alan
Cribb eds., 1995).
34. Cynthia B. Cohen & Peter J. Cohen, Required Reconsideration of "Do-Not-
Resuscitate" Orders in the Operating Room, 20 L. MED. & HEALTH CARE 354 (1992).
35. HOUSE OF LORDS, PAPER 21(1994).
36. See Campbell, supra note 33.
19961
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regardless of how ill-advised the patient's decision may appear
to others.37
The English authorities do not go so far, stressing that only
advance directives that are "clearly established" and "applicable
in the circumstances" must be respected.38 The Law Commis-
sion recommended that the current English position should be
formalised and adopted: "If a patient is incapacitated, .. . a
clearly established anticipatory decision should be as effective as
the contemporaneous decision of the patient would be in the
circumstances to which it is applicable. '39
There is on the one hand a danger that slavish adherence to
an advance directive, as the Canadian ruling suggests, may lead
to treatment being withheld when the patient might have had
second thoughts, and on the other hand, a risk that the latitude
given by the English approach leads to replacement of the pa-
tient's autonomy by the, however benevolent, intrusion of the
reasonable man. The Law Commission suggests that if there is
evidence of second thoughts, the requirement of applicability in
the circumstances will not be met.
IV. DECISIONS ABOUT THE INCOMPETENT
An incompetent patient, specifically one who has not given an
advance directive, can give no direct guidance as to a decision,
which must be about rather than by him or her. There are, how-
ever, several mechanisms available. The three principal ones
are: (1) the court appointing a proxy or guardian to make deci-
sions for the patient; (2) the court acting as a surrogate to make
the decision that, on the evidence, this patient would have made
if free to decide (a quasi subjective test); and (3) the court mak-
ing a decision based on the best interests of any patient in the
position of this patient (a quasi objective test). It is possible to
conflate the first two if the decision of the guardian is subject to
the jurisdiction of the court.
The seminal case in this area is In re Quinlan.4 0 In this case, a
guardian was appointed and his decision, which was based on a
substituted judgment, was subjected to the scrutiny of the court.
Later United States decisions have adopted the same approach,
37. 82 D.L.R.4th 298 (Ont. Ct. App. 1991) (LEXIS, CANADA library, DLR file
at *10).
38. Re T, [1992] 4 All E.R. 649 (C.A.); Bland, [1993] 1 All E.R. 821 (H.L.).
39. LAW COMM'N, supra note 7, at § 3.13.
40. 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
[Vol. 5
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with or without the interposition of a guardian, based either on
a notional attitude where there was no evidence of the particu-
lar patient's views,' or on such informal evidence as there may
be of the views of the patient if available. 2 This approach was
approved by Lord Donaldson, Master of the Rolls, in Re J
(Wardship: Medical Treatment),43 but has not subsequently been
adopted by other courts here. The Law Commission accommo-
dated it in part in suggesting that any evidence of actual wishes
or attitudes should be taken into account in assessing best
interests.44
The English approach, as suggested above, is indeed the out-
wardly objective best interests test. This was expressly stated in
Bland, and this approach was also approved by the Law Com-
mission. The Commission also suggested that medical treatment
attorneys could be appointed by patients in anticipation of inca-
pacity, and medical treatment proxies appointed by a judicial
body for an incapacitated patient. These could make decisions
and give or withhold consent to treatment within a new statu-
tory judicial framework, but would be obliged to act in the best
interests of the patient.45
The court will lean toward preserving life unless the evidence
suggests that the future will be demonstrably so intolerable that
life will not be worth living. However, it has been recognised
that there may be cases where "life" may be sustained indefi-
nitely by artificial means without evident suffering, but with a
negligible quality of life (for example, the persistent vegetative
state (PVS) cases). Sir Stephen Brown, P., the Court of Appeal,
and the House of Lords all ruled in Bland that it was not unlaw-
ful to withhold treatment in PVS cases, and that artificial nutri-
tion is treatment for this purpose. Sir Stephen relied on the
judgment in the United States case of Cruzan v. Missouri De-
partment of Health, which reached the same conclusion.
The House of Lords placed the Bland decision on somewhat
different grounds. A PVS patient has no best interests that are
41. See, e.g., Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d
417 (Mass. 1977).
42. Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). Cf. In re Conroy,
486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985).
43. [1990] 3 All E.R. 930 (C.A.). In this case, the quality of life was not such as to
justify treatment on a balance of evils test. Cf. Re JHL (1992) (unreported), a New
Zealand case where it was held inappropriate to treat a terminal cancer patient for an
unrelated condition. Again, there was a balance to be struck.
44. LAW COMM'N, supra note 7, at § 3.49.
45. Id. at § 5.16 (attorney), § 4.25 (proxy).
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discernible. It cannot, therefore, be said that continuing treat-
ment is in this patient's best interests. It cannot, therefore, be
the doctor's duty to continue to treat, and there is, thus, no justi-
fication for the continuation of bodily invasion. This is not the
same as the United States approach, which is that the surrogate
decision maker steps in the shoes of the patient.46 It is an objec-
tive test, without enquiry as to what this patient would have
wanted.
Each of the five Law Lords used different language, but it is
all to the same effect: (1) withholding treatment 47 is an omission;
(2) criminal liability exists for omissions only where there is a
breach of a duty to act; (3) with an incompetent patient, the
doctors must decide on treatment in the patient's best interests
and on the basis of sound professional judgment (nonconsensual
invasive treatment could be justified on this basis while there is
a hope of recovery); (4) in a hopeless case, there is no best inter-
est in being kept alive, so the justification is gone; and (5) since
the duty is gone, there can be no criminal liability.
It is the fourth proposition that is crucial since it admits, albeit
in a negative sense, an argument about quality of life. This was
fully recognised by the judges, who were, as a result, deeply con-
cerned about the implications of the case. They expressly ac-
cepted that there was a divergence of views. They also accepted
that very different considerations would apply in the more typi-
cal case where it could not be shown that the cortex had been
physically destroyed and there was some element of sentience
present.48
Concern has rightly been expressed by a range of commenta-
tors that if one allows an argument about quality of life, one has
crossed an essential moral dividing line and is on the proverbial
slippery slope to "euthanasia" of the unfit on grounds of con-
venience or even economics. In an attempt to ward off this fear,
the judges did make it clear that a ruling was required from the
court in every case, that two expert medical opinions would be
46. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417.
47. Nasogastric nutrition and hydration were held to be treatment, rather than
basic care.
48. Bland, [1993] 1 All E.R. 821 (H.L.). Lord Goff, Lord Browne-Wilkinson, and
Lord Mustill all refer specifically to Guillain-Barrd Syndrome as typifying this
problem.
[Vol. 5
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required,49 and that the wishes of relatives must be taken into
account.
Lord Mustill articulated certain issues that had been raised in
a veiled way. It was being half-suggested that treatment could
be withheld or terminated in the "best interests of the commu-
nity." This, in part, addressed the stress on the family and care-
takers of pursuing treatment, but also acknowledged the
question of the allocation of health resources:
The large resources of skill, labour and money now being de-
voted to Anthony Bland ° might in the opinion of many be
more fruitfully employed in improving the condition of other
patients, who if treated may have useful, healthy and enjoya-
ble lives for many years to come.... In social terms [this argu-
ment] has great force, and it will have to be faced in the end.
But this is not a task which the courts can possibly undertake.
A social cost-benefit analysis of this kind, which would have to
embrace "mercy-killing," to which exactly the same considera-
tions apply, must be for Parliament alone, and the outcome of
it is at present quite impossible to foresee.5 1
This is, in part, a matter of resource allocation.52 It also raises
other social, rather than economic, issues of the impact of ac-
tions on the family. In Bland, the family supported what was
being done. The Law Commission stressed that it is the inter-
ests of the patient that are paramount, and the impact on the
family and others must be subordinated to them, although they
should be fully consulted and their views given great weight.5 3
The judges were also all too clearly aware that they were creat-
ing a narrow legal distinction 54 between permissible killing by
omission and impermissible active killing.55
49. BRITISH MEDICAL ASSOCIATION MEDICAL ETHICS COMMITTEE, DISCUSSION
PAPER ON TREATMENT OF PATIENTS IN THE PERSISTENT VEGETATIVE STATE (1992).
50. One estimate is direct costs of £40,000 per year.
51. Bland, [1993] 1 All E.R. 821 (H.L.) (LEXIS, UK library, ALLCAS file at *39).
52. The courts have always refused to become involved in such issues of resource
allocation. See, e.g., the "Baby Barber" case. Diana Tribe & Gill Korgaonkar, With-
drawal of Medical Treatment, 2 J. MED. DEF. UNION 42 (1993) (concluding that for
this and other reasons, legislation is necessary).
53. LAW COMM'N, supra note 7, at § 3.57.
54. Lord Lowry specifically referred to the possibility that the sceptical layman
might see a distinction without a difference, since the intent in each case was the
same, namely to curtail life.
55. The distinction between active and passive euthanasia is well known, if illogi-
cal, and respected by all legal systems. The Dutch Parliament has passed legislation
that alters this position. Active euthanasia has been officially tolerated in Holland for
some years.
1996]
11
Hodgson: Rights of the Terminally Ill Patient
Published by LAW eCommons, 1996
Annals of Health Law
A doctor who follows the directions of the court in a wardship
case is of course acting lawfully, as is a doctor who obtains a
declaratory judgment in relation to an adult. In essence, the
court is saying that such issues are matters of medical ethics.
The court will not seek to define the parameters of proper medi-
cal action, but will limit itself to a ruling on the case in point to
protect the particular doctor.
The difficulty of the Bland case from the point of view of
those responsible for emergency and intensive treatment is that
they must, in effect, treat as long as there is any hope, since it is
impossible to establish initially the extent of some conditions
such as hypoxic brain damage. Indeed, no diagnosis of PVS can
be made for twelve months. Within that time, some degree of
recovery is possible. It is, therefore, not possible to say with
certainty that treatment is to no avail, and, therefore, not possi-
ble to withhold it lawfully. The best interests argument must
result in the presumption to treat at that stage.
It was stressed in Bland that these issues are so important that
a reference to the court will be necessary, wherever this is prac-
ticable. The procedures and tests to be applied were further
considered by the Court of Appeal in Frenchay Healthcare NHS
Trust v. S.56 In this case, S had been unconscious for over two
years following a drug overdose. The medical evidence sug-
gested no quality of life, although not all the doctors specifically
referred to it as a PVS case; there was some suggestion of lim-
ited cognitive function, and the court accepted that this was a
less clear-cut case than Bland. The matter came before the
court as an urgent application when a gastrotomy tube became
dislodged; the doctors did not consider it to be in S's best inter-
ests to operate to replace this, but wished to have the benefit of
a declaration of lawfulness. There was time for S to be legally
represented, but the only medical evidence was that adduced by
the Trust.
The court acknowledged that there might be emergency cases
when no application at all was feasible, cases like the present
where an abbreviated legal process was properly adopted, and
cases where the full Bland procedure could be adopted.
The main criticism of the judge in the case was that he had
allowed the doctors to make the decision by uncritically ac-
cepting the medical evidence. This is not a new criticism; there
56. [1994] 1 W.L.R. 601 (C.A.) (LEXIS, UK library, ALLCAS file).
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are many observers who assert that judges abdicate their re-
sponsibility to investigate medical standards and practices. Sir
Thomas Bingham expressed a view that this approach was
wrong:
It is, I think, important that there should not be a belief that
what the doctor says is the patient's best interest is the pa-
tient's best interest. For my part I would certainly reserve to
the court the ultimate power and duty to review the doctor's
decision in the light of all the facts.57
However, he goes on to say that in this case, there is a clear
and essentially uncontroverted medical opinion, and that to re-
ject it is to compel doctors to act contrary to their beliefs. He
stated:
That may sometimes be the right course for the court to adopt,
but it seems to me to be a highly unsatisfactory position into
which one should be reluctant to lead doctors unless the court
has real doubt about the reliability, or bona fides, or correct-
ness of the medical opinion in question.5"
That gives a prima facie validity to medical opinion evidence
that is not accorded to any other type of evidence adduced by a
party who bears the burden of proof. One inevitable side effect
is to increase the burden of moral responsibility on the doctors
in the case, since it will, in practice, be their opinion, not that of
the court, that is determinative and, therefore, the effective
cause of the withdrawal of treatment.
It is, of course, vitally important in this context to ensure that
there is a proper procedure for dealing with resuscitation is-
sues.59 The nontreatment issues associated with nonresuscita-
tion are the emergency cases where there is not even the fig leaf
of a legal declaration to stand between doctors and their con-
sciences. It may be difficult to argue that the treatment meets
the standard expected in R. v. Malcherek6° if there is an absence
of a coherent policy in this respect. The British Medical Associ-
ation and Royal College of Nursing have issued proposed guide-
lines to meet this lack of consistency.61 The guidelines stress the
need to respect the wishes of the patient where known. This is
57. Id. at *8 (LEXIS, UK library, ALLCAS file) (emphasis added).
58. Id. at *8-9 (LEXIS, UK library, ALLCAS file).
59. The absence of such procedures in English practice was highlighted in a Chief
Medical Officer's circular dated December 20, 1991.
60. [1981] 2 All E.R. 422 (C.A.).
61. Chris Mihill, BMA Urges Right to Die Hospital Code, GUARDIAN, Mar. 3,
1993, Home Page.
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clearly right. In other cases, Bland indicates that the best inter-
ests approach be followed.
The guidelines appear to give great weight to the wishes of the
family. This appears to run counter to the views of the Law
Lords, who indicated that the family should be consulted and
involved but should not be the final arbiters.62 This indication is
also consistent with the rejection in Bland of the American doc-
trine of "substituted judgment," where the court seeks to put
itself in the position of the victim with an assumption of presci-
ence and purports to decide the case on the basis of a putative
advance direction: "[T]he court must decide what its ward
would choose, if he were in a position to make a sound judg-
ment."63 It may be simply that the concept of the advance direc-
tive is still so alien to the English judges that they do not know
how to apply it to the wishes of the typical victim. In S, there
was some reference to the wishes of the parents, who were ap-
parently divided in their views. There is no reference to any
assumed wishes of S himself. I am aware of at least one poten-
tial PVS case in the East Midlands where the mother has ex-
pressed objection to withdrawal of treatment, although the
diagnosis is, provisionally, as poor as in Bland. No application
has been reported in this case.
Against this background, it is reasonable and understandable
that English courts have reacted as they have by giving great
scope to the doctor's professional judgment. The application of
the Bolam64 test, which this entailed, has attracted reservations,
as in Bland itself. This was exemplified in Malcherek and again
in a recent case 65 where the court declined to direct doctors to
treat in circumstances where, in their judgment, it was not in the
best interests of the patient. However, in an American case,66
the court refused to allow doctors to withdraw ventilation
against the opposition of the family. This decision appears to
indicate that there may be situations where even a bona fide
exercise of medical judgment is open to review. It seems doubt-
62. The majority of complaints are of inappropriate resuscitation. There is up-to-
date evidence that cardiopulmonary resuscitation is often applied inappropriately.
Annie Chellew, Outcome, Ethics and Accountability, 17 NURSING STANDARD 37
(1993).
63. In re Weberlist, 360 N.Y.S.2d 783 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974).
64. Bolam v. Friem Hosp. Management Comm., [1957] 2 All E.R. 118 (Q.B.).
65. Re J (Wardship: Medical Treatment), [1990] 3 All E.R. 930 (C.A.).
66. Steven H. Miles, Informed Demand for "Non-beneficial" Medical Treatment,
325 NEW ENG. J. MED. 512 (1991) (referring to In re Helga Wanglie, No. PX-91-283
(Probate Ct., Hennepin County, Minn. June 28, 1991)).
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ful that an English court would accept an invitation to carry out
such a review.
V. EUTHANASIA
The law takes a very clear, indeed simplistic, view: deliberate
killing is wrong. It will be murder whatever the motive, unless
reduced to voluntary manslaughter by the defence of diminished
responsibility, which may apply to a relative rendered mentally
disordered by grief and stress.
In only one case in recent years has a member of the healing
professions been arraigned to face a murder charge as a result of
a good faith clinical decision to end another's life.67 It is, in fact,
a case involving a handicapped neonate, but the underlying
principles also apply to other cases. The baby in question was
born with Down's syndrome and was rejected by his parents,
who did not want him to survive. Dr. Arthur concurred with
their view.
The child was not fed and was dosed with dihydrocodeine
(DF 118), a sedative/painkiller. He died some three days later.
Dr. Arthur was initially charged with murder, but this was
changed to a charge of attempted murder when it became clear
that the child had other serious disabilities, which were only de-
tected postmortem and which might well have proved fatal
within the same time span in any event.
The basis of the prosecution case was that, although it was
accepted that Dr. Arthur acted from the highest motives, he had
overstepped the boundary; it was impermissible for a doctor to
take steps to ensure that a patient would not survive, even when
that patient faced a life of suffering and, in the context of a neo-
nate, the parents supported the decision.
A number of eminent paediatricians were called by the de-
fence, and they testified that there was a narrow, but crucial,
dividing line between taking life and allowing death to occur.
The former was unethical and impermissible; the latter was per-
missible in a limited number of cases where there was massive
handicap and the parents concurred. The judge made it clear to
the jury that they were the judges of the standard that was to
apply; it was not enough to establish what the consensus of med-
ical opinion was:
67. R. v. Arthur, [1981] 12 B.M.L.R. 1 (Crown Court) (LEXIS, UK library, ALL-
CASE file). In R. v. Adams, [1957] Crim. L.R. 773, there were undertones of unethi-
cal practice.
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However serious the case may be; however much the disad-
vantage of a mongol or, indeed, any other handicapped child,
no doctor has the right to kill it.
There is no special law in this country that places doctors in a
separate category and gives them extra protection over the
rest of us. Neither, in law, is there any special power, facility
or licence to kill children who are handicapped or seriously
disadvantaged in an irreversible way.68
On the other hand, the standards of the profession were not
to be ignored altogether:
[W]hatever a profession may evolve as a system of standards
of ethics, it cannot stand on its own, and cannot survive if it is
in conflict with the law .... But I imagine that you will think
long and hard before deciding that doctors, of the eminence
we have heard, representing to you what medical ethics are,
and apparently have been over a period of time in that great
profession, have evolved standards which amount to commit-
ting crime.69
In the end, Dr. Arthur was acquitted, and the case was not
referred to the Court of Appeal by the Attorney General for
further consideration.70 There is no way of establishing the ac-
tual basis of the jury verdict. It has been suggested that the re-
sult gave excessive weight to the parents' wishes, whereas the
doctor's duty was to the child.71
It would seem to follow from Bland that if Dr. Arthur was
omitting to treat (in other words, if the DF 118 was not itself
designed to kill), then the approach was correct, and the jury
was rightly directed to consider whether there was a duty to
treat, seen in the light of best interests and Bolam.
Without in any way diminishing or trivialising the anguish as-
sociated with any such decision, it is relatively easy for a doctor
to decide either to terminate treatment, or not to intervene, if
the patient's condition is demonstrably hopeless. What is much
more difficult is the decision where the prognosis is a very bad
one in terms of quality of life, as distinct from quantity.
Fletcher, writing from an American perspective, talks of the ter-
mination of ventilation as "permitting death to occur" rather
than causing death, so that a doctor will be liable only if he has
68. Arthur, [1981] 12 B.M.L.R. 1 (LEXIS, UK library, ALLCASE file at *13).
69. Id. at *21.
70. There is in England no appeal against an acquittal, but a case may be referred
for a ruling on any point of law of general importance.
71. Malcolm Brahams & Diane Brahams, R. v. Arthur: Is Legislation Appropri-
ate?, 78 LAW SOCIETY's GUARDIAN GAZETrE 1342 (1981).
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permitted death to occur in breach of his duty to the patient.72
Skegg prefers the phrase "letting the patient die," but appears to
favour the same approach.73
The earlier case of R. v. Adams7 4 also concerned a prosecu-
tion of a doctor for the murder of a patient. The elderly patient
was terminally ill and was given high doses of morphine and her-
oin. These resulted in a shortening of the quantum of life,
although there was evidence that they were therapeutic in the
sense of palliating pain. This case recognises that quality of life
may be as relevant as quantity, and that the secondary function
of medicine, if cure is not possible, is care. There must, how-
ever, be a reasonable balance struck.75
Until recently, the debate on these issues was conducted es-
sentially as one of medical ethics. Such litigation as there was
tended to be civil in nature; doctors sought approval for deci-
sions they had already made in principle, or patients (or those
responsible for them) sought ratification of their choices. Even
before the Bland case, the apparently only tangentially relevant
Irish litigation over abortion reminded us that there is also a
criminal law aspect to the matter.76 A similar issue arose in the
United Kingdom in 1939 as the result of a highly publicised deci-
sion by a leading gynaecologist to carry out an abortion on a
teenage rape victim on the grounds of risk to her life due to
psychological stress; the response was a prosecution for an of-
fence of unlawfully procuring an abortion.77 Although the sum-
ming up to the jury was fairly sympathetic to the defendant,
drawing a sharp distinction between the activities of the sordid
commercial back-street abortionist and the actions of a leading
surgeon acting purely philanthropically, it was made clear that
the jurors were ultimately the arbiters of what was legitimate in
this area. They had to decide in the instant case whether what
was done was done in good faith for the preservation of the life
of the mother. The result was an acquittal. 78
Prior to Arthur, this case was the leading one in the field of
medicocriminal law. Both cases show the same judicial attitude:
72. GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 610 (1978).
73. PETER D. G. SKEGG, LAW ETHICS AND MEDICINE 174 (1984).
74. [1957] Crim. L.R. 773.
75. See Brazier, supra note 20, at 446; Campbell, supra note 33.
76. The apparent issue was the liberty of the teenage rape victim to seek an abor-
tion abroad in the face of Irish legislation prohibiting abortion and counseling.
77. Offences Against the Person Act, 1861, 24 & 25 Vict. c.100, §§ 58-59 (Eng.).
78. R. v. Boume, [1939] 3 All E.R. 615 (K.B.) (Ireland).
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respect for the standards of the profession, but a refusal to allow
the standards to determine the issue. In each case the jury ap-
pears to have endorsed the views of the profession, although it is
not possible to say whether this was a positive endorsement or
merely a refusal to scapegoat a professional who was clearly act-
ing conscientiously, albeit improperly.
This approach will mean that a jury (or in a civil case the
judge) will have to consider the doctors' actions in light of their
conception of what is required by public morality, guided, but
not constrained, by the evidence of professional practice and
ethics. This approach has the advantage of allowing a doctor
who abides by the standards of the profession to have this con-
sidered by the court, but the opinion of society at large is the
overriding factor.
The position in respect of positive treatment is clearly differ-
ent. It is, as we have seen, legitimate to administer drugs or
other treatment for the purpose of relieving pain and suffering,
even though life is incidentally shortened.79
Several years ago, Dr. Lodwig was tried and acquitted on the
basis of the use of a cocktail of drugs including powerful painkil-
lers and potassium chloride (KCI). It was accepted that there
was a therapeutic effect overall, even though the KCI was simply
a poison. 0
In September 1992, Dr. Cox was convicted of the attempted
murder of a patient to whom he had administered a fatal dose of
KC1. The case raised strong emotions. Dr. Cox had been treat-
ing the patient for many years. She had been in appalling pain
and was terminally ill. She had asked for relief from pain. Her
family fully supported the doctor's actions. The jurors were
clearly deeply affected at the necessity of returning a guilty ver-
dict, and Mr. Justice Ognall, in imposing a suspended sentence,
made it clear that he fully accepted that Dr. Cox was acting out
of the highest motives.
Although Dr. Cox had seriously transgressed the law, it was a
conscientious error, not opportunism or malice in the ordinary
sense of the word. The subsequent decision of the General
Medical Counsel (GMC) to take no further action after finding
79. R. v. Adams, [1957] Crim. L.R. 773.
80. Diana Brahams, Criminality and Compassion, LAW SOCIETY'S GAZEITE
(London), Sept. 30, 1992, at 2.
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Dr. Cox guilty of professional misconduct also reflects this con-
sensus view.8 '
A straw poll of doctors from a variety of specialties whom I
met fortuitously at a college reunion a few days later elicited
that, while most sympathised with Dr. Cox, they also felt that he
had been ill advised to administer a substance with no known
therapeutic effect. They considered that if he had administered
a cocktail, partly therapeutic and yet clearly life shortening, no
prosecution would have been brought. This is, no doubt, a prac-
tical answer, but it leaves the issues of principle unresolved. 82
The immediate lesson is clear: while inaction is allowable, un-
less there is a clear duty to act, any positive treatment must be
demonstrably therapeutic, in the sense that it is either an at-
tempt to save or prolong life or, at the least, a bona fide attempt
to relieve suffering, and that a doctor or health professional who
dares to go beyond this limit is at risk of prosecution.
Although the Law Lords in Bland83 were at pains to point out
that they were not discussing active euthanasia, which amounts
to murder, they indicated that they believed the answer they
were able to give was unsatisfactory, being at best a narrow and
legalistic one. They were comforted by the thought that the case
before them was a very clear one, but they all believed that any
consideration of the parameters of euthanasia was a matter for
Parliament:
Where a case raises wholly new moral and social issues, in my
judgment it is not for the judges to seek to develop new, all
embracing, principles of law in a way which reflects the indi-
vidual judges' moral stance when society as a whole is substan-
tially divided on the relevant moral issues .... The judges'
function in this area of the law should be to apply the princi-
ples which society, through the democratic process, adopts, not
to impose their standards on society!'
With respect, this seems to be unanswerable.
Even from this limited perspective, it is clear that the law is
not clear. There is a reluctance on the part of the prosecuting
authorities, judges, and juries to stigmatise as criminal, or even
tortious, behaviour that is conscientious and ethical.
81. Id.
82. Subsequent discussion with experts in pain relief (nurses rather than doctors)
produced a similar result, but rather less sympathy with the doctor, who ought to have
taken advice.
83. Bland, [1993] 1 All E.R. 821 (H.L.) (LEXIS, UK library, ALLCAS file).
84. Id. at *24 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson) (LEXIS, UK library, ALLCAS file).
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However, there is no special rule for the health care profes-
sional. There have been a number of proposals for a statutory
offence of failure to treat a patient, but these have come to noth-
ing. There is certainly no official enthusiasm for a witch hunt.
The Arthur case was only taken because of a complaint from a
member of the public with very strong views. The Cox case
arose from a complaint by a nurse who realised the implications
of the entry in the victim's records made by Dr. Cox. It is note-
worthy that the initial reaction was that this nurse had destroyed
her own career by breaking ranks. There is certainly a growing
concern with standards and a belief that the various forms of
enquiry available-Coroner's inquest, complaint to the GMC or
United Kingdom Central Council (the principal regulatory body
for nurses, midwives, and health visitors), internal National
Health Services disciplinary systems, and civil actions for dam-
ages-are insufficient to identify and remedy inadequate or
dangerous practice. Landmark cases such as Bourne, Arthur,
and Cox may have a part to play, but at what cost to the unfor-
tunate practitioner involved? The court in Barber v. Superior
Court of Los Angeles County stated: "[A] murder prosecution is
a poor way to design an ethical and moral code for doctors who
are faced with decisions concerning the use of costly and ex-
traordinary 'life support' equipment. '85 Or, one might add, in
any health care context.
This discussion has inevitably been medicocentric. The law
does tend to marginalise the patient. The cases, at least in the
United Kingdom, have turned on an evaluation of the doctor's
conduct.
Attitudes toward euthanasia embrace a wide spectrum. At
one end stand Dr. Jack Kevorkian and certain Dutch practition-
ers who regard the decision as being one for the patient. If pa-
tients wish to die, they are entitled to competent help to achieve
this with dignity and without undue pain or distress. It is the
ultimate expression of individual autonomy. The most extreme,
such as Dr. Henk Prins, will even terminate the lives of those
who are not competent to reach their own decision on the basis
of best interests.86 It was the prosecution case of Dr. Arthur
that fell into this category. This view is not acceptable officially
85. 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 486 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
86. There is persistent anecdotal material concerning the attempts of certain, usu-
ally Dutch, practitioners to encourage euthanasia. This is equally legally
unacceptable.
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in any jurisdiction, although Dr. Prins was not subjected to any
sanction for murder and Dr. Cox was dealt with very leniently.
Euthanasia of competent adults is semiofficially tolerated in the
Netherlands, and, no doubt, occurs unofficially to varying de-
grees elsewhere.
At the other extreme stand the militant supporters of the
right to life. In most cases, this view-point arises from religious
conviction, although it may arise from a belief in the need for an
absolute protection of life to prevent descent on a slippery slope
leading to compulsory euthanasia.
Supporters of the hospice movement and experts in palliative
care claim that most requests for euthanasia from the terminally
ill arise from a failure to provide the best care practicable.87
There is undoubtedly much in this, but there is clearly a body of
patients and potential patients who claim that they actually or
prospectively wish to have the option of euthanasia, or at least
assisted suicide, which raises similar ethical dilemmas. At pres-
ent, English law leans firmly against this. As stated above, the
judicial House of Lords in Bland set themselves against it. The
legislative House of Lords came to the same conclusion in en-
dorsing the recommendation of their Select Committee that
there be no change to the law, even to the extent of reducing
mercy killing from murder to manslaughter.
VI. ASSISTED SUICIDE
Suicide (felo de se) and attempted suicide were decriminal-
ised by the Suicide Act of 1961. It remains an offence to aid,
abet, counsel, or procure the suicide of another.8 8 There has
been little use of the Act, and the only reported case is not a
prosecution, but a civil action to determine the scope of the sec-
tion.89 A pressure group called EXIT issued a booklet entitled
"A Guide to Selfdeliverance," which, as the title implied, gave
advice on methods of suicide. The court refused to declare that
the mere issue and supply of this booklet necessarily amounted
to the offence. There is no doubt that suicide in a euthanasia
context occurs, and that it is achieved with the assistance of rela-
tives, friends, and medical advisers. Indeed, in some cases the
87. See Michael Kearney, Hospice Medicine, in CHANGING IDEAS IN HEALTH
CARE 15 (David Seedhouse & Alan Cribb eds., 1989).
88. Suicide Act, 1961, c.60, § 2(1) (Eng.). The maximum penalty is 14 years of
imprisonment.
89. Attorney General v. Able and Others, [1984] 1 All E.R. 277 (Q.B.).
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dividing line between assisting suicide and actual euthanasia is
hard to draw and may not represent any real ethical distinction.
This is, however, not an issue that impinges on the public con-
sciousness to any extent.90 There is certainly no agitation here
for any entitlement to physician-assisted suicide, let alone a de-
cision authorising it. There is, indeed, no framework of constitu-
tional guarantees of liberty of action that could be invoked to
provide legal warrant for this.91
CONCLUSION
Most of the conclusions that follow are all directly supported
by the House of Lords decision in Bland. In many cases, this
decision confirms what was already known to be the law, rather
than breaking new ground. Many of these conclusions also re-
late to other case law and are supported by the Law Commis-
sion and/or the House of Lords Select Committee. While these
do not have the force of law, they are highly persuasive.
Some things are clear:
* It is always lawful and ethical to provide (with actual or con-
structive consent) palliative treatment, such as pain relief,
although this may have the side effect of shortening life.
* It is never lawful or ethical to take positive action designed to
curtail life.
" Withholding treatment by omission may or may not be lawful,
depending on the circumstances. It will be lawful if there is an
operative consent, or the "best interests" test is satisfied. Ar-
tificial nutrition and hydration are treatment and may, under
certain circumstances, be lawfully withheld. Switching off life
support is an omission to continue it.
" A competent patient may always refuse treatment or require
treatment to be discontinued. This consent may be in the
form of an advance directive or the appointment of a medical
attorney. There may have to be an enquiry as to competence
or the continued effect of the consent.
" Parents or the court in wardship proceedings may consent or
withhold consent on behalf of a child. A child who is compe-
90. Contrast the position in the United States. See Thomas J. Marzen, Out, Out,
Brief Candle: Constitutionally Prescribed Suicide for the Terminally 11l, 21 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 799 (1994).
91. See Brian Bix, Physician Assisted Suicide and the United States Constitution, 58
MOD. L. REV. 404 (1995).
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tent under Gillick may refuse consent, but must appreciate
the full consequences of this refusal.
" No one has the power to consent in the case of an adult who is
physically or mentally incapable, but the court may make a
declaration as to the legality of a proposed course of action.
" The judges are uncomfortable at being given the role of arbi-
ters of social morality.
Some issues are tolerably clear:
" In the case of a patient who is not competent, the doctor must
act in the best interests of the patient. These are established
objectively. Any indication of actual intentions should be
taken into the best interests equation.
" Invasive treatment can be justified only by consent or neces-
sity; it is not necessary to preserve a wholly vegetative exist-
ence and is unjustified in this context.
" It is not wrongful to refuse or withhold treatment in a hope-
less (vegetative) case.92 Omission to treat is only wrongful
where it arises in breach of a medical or other duty to act.
* The duty is owed to the patient, not to the family.
Some issues are unresolved:
* At what point it is proper to conclude that treatment is not in
the interests of a patient who is to some degree sentient? The
issue of how best interests are determined is a medical and
ethical, not a legal, analysis of benefit and detriment.
* When and under what circumstances is active euthanasia justi-
fied? This is a matter for Parliament. 93
" Can, and if so to what extent, decisions on withholding treat-
ment be influenced by the availability of resources and com-
peting demands on them? This, too, is a matter for
Parliament.
92. The court will not compel doctors to treat contrary to their professional judg-
ment. Re J (Wardship: Medical Treatment), [1990] 3 All E.R. 930 (C.A.). This issue
was not discussed in Bland.
93. The House of Lords Select Committee Report appears to have concluded the
matter for the time being.
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